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What is Clinton's real interest in Kosovo? [WAS:Re: hidden machinery]
On Sun, 18 Apr 1999 20:30:06 +0200 (CEST), Anonymous wrote:
>>But what is Clinton's real interest in Kosovo? Nobody
>>knows.
>
>We'd like a base there; its in our national interest;
>after all, it is where the Crusades are ongoing; where the state boundaries
>flex more than most; close to some valuable assets, in a sensitive region.
There was also a post on Cypherpunks last week saying that Albania was declared
to be within the occupied zone. No wonder!
=========== forwarded article ============
KOSOVO "FREEDOM FIGHTERS" FINANCED BY ORGANISED CRIME
by
Michel Chossudovsky
Professor of Economics at the University of Ottawa and author of The
Globalization of Poverty, Impacts of IMF and World Bank Reforms, Third World
Network, Penang and Zed Books, London, 1997.
C Copyright by Michel Chossudovsky, Ottawa, 1999. All rights reserved.
Permission is granted to post this text on non-commercial internet sites,
provided the essay remains intact and the copyright note is displayed. To
publish this text in printed and/or other forms contact the author at
chossudovsky@sprint.ca
Heralded by the global media as a humanitarian peace-keeping mission, NATO's
ruthless bombing of Belgrade and Pristina goes far beyond the breach of
international law. While Slobodan Milosevic is demonised, portrayed as a
remorseless dictator, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) is upheld as a
self-respecting nationalist movement struggling for the rights of ethnic
Albanians. The truth of the matter is that the KLA is sustained by organised
crime with the tacit approval of the United States and its allies.
Following a pattern set during the War in Bosnia, public opinion has been
carefully misled. The multibillion dollar Balkans narcotics trade has played a
crucial role in "financing the conflict" in Kosovo in accordance with Western
economic, strategic and military objectives. Amply documented by European
police files, acknowledged by numerous studies, the links of the Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA) to criminal syndicates in Albania, Turkey and the
European Union have been known to Western governments and intelligence agencies
since the mid-1990s. "...The financing of the Kosovo guerilla war poses
critical questions and it sorely test claims of an "ethical" foreign policy.
Should the West back a guerilla army that appears to partly financed by
organised crime." 1
While KLA leaders were shaking hands with US Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright at Rambouillet, Europol (the European Police Organization based in the
Hague) was "preparing a report for European interior and justice ministers on a
connection between the KLA and Albanian drug gangs."2 In the meantime, the
rebel army has been skilfully heralded by the global media (in the months
preceding the NATO bombings) as broadly representative of the interests of
ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.
With KLA leader Hashim Thaci (a 29 year "freedom fighter") appointed as chief
negotiator at Rambouillet, the KLA has become the de facto helmsman of the
peace process on behalf of the ethnic Albanian majority and this despite its
links to the drug trade. The West was relying on its KLA puppets to
rubber-stamp an agreement which would have transformed Kosovo into an occupied
territory under Western Administration.
Ironically Robert Gelbard, America's special envoy to Bosnia, had described the
KLA last year as "terrorists". Christopher Hill, America's chief negotiator and
architect of the Rambouillet agreement "has also been a strong critic of the
KLA for its alleged dealings in drugs."3 Moreover, barely a few two months
before Rambouillet, the US State Department had acknowledged (based on reports
from the US Observer Mission) the role of the KLA in terrorising and uprooting
ethnic Albanians: "...the KLA harass or kidnap anyone who comes to the police,
... KLA representatives had threatened to kill villagers and burn their homes
if they did not join the KLA [a process which has continued since the NATO
bombings]... [T]he KLA harassment has reached such intensity that residents of
six villages in the Stimlje region are "ready to flee." 4
While backing a "freedom movement" with links to the drug trade, the West seems
also intent in bypassing the civilian Kosovo Democratic League and its leader
Ibrahim Rugova who has called for an end to the bombings and expressed his
desire to negotiate a peaceful settlement with the Yugoslav authorities.5 It is
worth recalling that a few days before his March 31st Press Conference, Rugova
had been reported by the KLA (alongside three other leaders including Fehmi
Agani) to have been killed by the Serbs.
Covert Financing of "Freedom Fighters"
Remember Oliver North and the Contras? The pattern in Kosovo is similar to
other CIA covert operations in Central America, Haiti and Afghanistan where
"freedom fighters" were financed through the laundering of drug money. Since
the onslaught of the Cold War, Western intelligence agencies have developed a
complex relationship to the illegal narcotics trade. In case after case, drug
money laundered in the international banking system has financed covert
operations.
According to author Alfred McCoy, the pattern of covert financing was
established in the Indochina war. In the 1960s, the Meo army in Laos was funded
by the narcotics trade as part of Washington's military strategy against the
combined forces of the neutralist government of Prince Souvanna Phouma and the
Pathet Lao.6
The pattern of drug politics set in Indochina has since been replicated in
Central America and the Caribbean. "The rising curve of cocaine imports to the
US", wrote journalist John Dinges "followed almost exactly the flow of US arms
and military advisers to Central America".7
The military in Guatemala and Haiti, to which the CIA provided covert support,
were known to be involved in the trade of narcotics into Southern Florida. And
as revealed in the Iran-Contra and Bank of Commerce and Credit International
(BCCI) scandals, there was strong evidence that covert operations were funded
through the laundering of drug money. "Dirty money" recycled through the
banking system--often through an anonymous shell company-- became "covert
money," used to finance various rebel groups and guerilla movements including
the Nicaraguan Contras and the Afghan Mujahadeen. According to a 1991 Time
Magazine report: "Because the US wanted to supply the mujehadeen rebels in
Afghanistan with stinger missiles and other military hardware it needed the
full cooperation of Pakistan. By the mid-1980s, the CIA operation in Islamabad
was one of the largest US intelligence stations in the World. `If BCCI is such
an embarrassment to the US that forthright investigations are not being pursued
it has a lot to do with the blind eye the US turned to the heroin trafficking
in Pakistan', said a US intelligence officer.8
America and Germany join Hands
Since the early 1990s, Bonn and Washington have joined hands in establishing
their respective spheres of influence in the Balkans. Their intelligence
agencies have also collaborated. According to intelligence analyst John
Whitley, covert support to the Kosovo rebel army was established as a joint
endeavour between the CIA and Germany's Bundes Nachrichten Dienst (BND) (which
previously played a key role in installing a right wing nationalist government
under Franjo Tudjman in Croatia).9 The task to create and finance the KLA was
initially given to Germany: "They used German uniforms, East German weapons and
were financed, in part, with drug money".10 According to Whitley, the CIA was,
subsequently instrumental in training and equipping the KLA in Albania.11
The covert activities of Germany's BND were consistent with Bonn's intent to
expand its "Lebensraum" into the Balkans. Prior to the onset of the civil war
in Bosnia, Germany and its Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher had actively
supported secession; it had "forced the pace of international diplomacy" and
pressured its Western allies to recognize Slovenia and Croatia. According to
the Geopolitical Drug Watch, both Germany and the US favoured (although not
officially) the formation of a "Greater Albania" encompassing Albania, Kosovo
and parts of Macedonia.12 According to Sean Gervasi, Germany was seeking a free
hand among its allies "to pursue economic dominance in the whole of
Mitteleuropa."13
Islamic Fundamentalism in Support of the KLA
Bonn and Washington's "hidden agenda" consisted in triggering nationalist
liberation movements in Bosnia and Kosovo with the ultimate purpose of
destabilising Yugoslavia. The latter objective was also carried out "by turning
a blind eye" to the influx of mercenaries and financial support from Islamic
fundamentalist organisations.14
Mercenaries financed by Saudi Arabia and Koweit had been fighting in Bosnia.15
And the Bosnian pattern was replicated in Kosovo: Mujahadeen mercenaries from
various Islamic countries are reported to be fighting alongside the KLA in
Kosovo. German, Turkish and Afghan instructors were reported to be training the
KLA in guerilla and diversion tactics.16
According to a Deutsche Press-Agentur report, financial support from Islamic
countries to the KLA had been channelled through the former Albanian chief of
the National Information Service (NIS), Bashkim Gazidede.17 "Gazidede,
reportedly a devout Moslem who fled Albania in March of last year [1997], is
presently [1998] being investigated for his contacts with Islamic terrorist
organizations."18
The supply route for arming KLA "freedom fighters" are the rugged mountainous
borders of Albania with Kosovo and Macedonia. Albania is also a key point of
transit of the Balkans drug route which supplies Western Europe with grade four
heroin. 75% of the heroin entering Western Europe is from Turkey. And a large
part of drug shipments originating in Turkey transits through the Balkans.
According to the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), "it is estimated
that 4-6 metric tons of heroin leave each month from Turkey having [through the
Balkans] as destination Western Europe."19 A recent intelligence report by
Germany's Federal Criminal Agency suggests that: "Ethnic Albanians are now the
most prominent group in the distribution of heroin in Western consumer
countries."20
The Laundering of Dirty Money
In order to thrive, the criminal syndicates involved in the Balkans narcotics
trade need friends in high places. Smuggling rings with alleged links to the
Turkish State are said to control the trafficking of heroin through the Balkans
"cooperating closely with other groups with which they have political or
religious ties" including criminal groups in Albanian and Kosovo.21 In this new
global financial environment, powerful undercover political lobbies connected
to organized crime cultivate links to prominent political figures and officials
of the military and intelligence establishment.
The narcotics trade nonetheless uses respectable banks to launder large amounts
of dirty money. While comfortably removed from the smuggling operations per se,
powerful banking interests in Turkey but mainly those in financial centres in
Western Europe discretely collect fat commissions in a multibillion dollar
money laundering operation. These interests have high stakes in ensuring a safe
passage of drug shipments into Western European markets.
The Albanian Connection
Arms smuggling from Albania into Kosovo and Macedonia started at the beginning
of 1992, when the Democratic Party came to power, headed by President Sali
Berisha. An expansive underground economy and cross border trade had unfolded.
A triangular trade in oil, arms and narcotics had developed largely as a result
of the embargo imposed by the international community on Serbia and Montenegro
and the blockade enforced by Greece against Macedonia.
Industry and agriculture in Kosovo were spearheaded into bankruptcy following
the IMF's lethal "economic medicine" imposed on Belgrade in 1990. The embargo
was imposed on Yugoslavia. Ethnic Albanians and Serbs were driven into abysmal
poverty. Economic collapse created an environment which fostered the progress
of illicit trade. In Kosovo, the rate of unemployment increased to a staggering
70 percent (according to Western sources).
Poverty and economic collapse served to exacerbate simmering ethnic tensions.
Thousands of unemployed youths "barely out of their Teens" from an impoverished
population, were drafted into the ranks of the KLA...22
In neighbouring Albania, the free market reforms adopted since 1992 had created
conditions which favoured the criminalisation of State institutions. Drug money
was also laundered in the Albanian pyramids (ponzi schemes) which mushroomed
during the government of former President Sali Berisha (1992-1997).23 These
shady investment funds were an integral part of the economic reforms inflicted
by Western creditors on Albania.
Drug barons in Kosovo, Albania and Macedonia (with links to the Italian mafia)
had become the new economic elites, often associated with Western business
interests. In turn the financial proceeds of the trade in drugs and arms were
recycled towards other illicit activities (and vice versa) including a vast
prostitution racket between Albania and Italy. Albanian criminal groups
operating in Milan, "have become so powerful running prostitution rackets that
they have even taken over the Calabrians in strength and influence."24
The application of "strong economic medicine" under the guidance of the
Washington based Bretton Woods institutions had contributed to wrecking
Albania's banking system and precipitating the collapse of the Albanian
economy. The resulting chaos enabled American and European transnationals to
carefully position themselves. Several Western oil companies including
Occidental, Shell and British Petroleum had their eyes rivetted on Albania's
abundant and unexplored oil-deposits. Western investors were also gawking
Albania's extensive reserves of chrome, copper, gold, nickel and platinum...
The Adenauer Foundation had been lobbying in the background on behalf of German
mining interests. 25
Berisha's Minister of Defence Safet Zoulali (alleged to have been involved in
the illegal oil and narcotics trade) was the architect of the agreement with
Germany's Preussag (handing over control over Albania's chrome mines) against
the competing bid of the US led consortium of Macalloy Inc. in association with
Rio Tinto Zimbabwe (RTZ).26
Large amounts of narco-dollars had also been recycled into the privatisation
programmes leading to the acquisition of State assets by the mafias. In
Albania, the privatisation programme had led virtually overnight to the
development of a property owning class firmly committed to the "free market".
In Northern Albania, this class was associated with the Guegue "families"
linked to the Democratic Party.
Controlled by the Democratic Party under the presidency of Sali Berisha
(1992-97), Albania's largest financial "pyramid" VEFA Holdings had been set up
by the Guegue "families" of Northern Albania with the support of Western
banking interests. VEFA was under investigation in Italy in 1997 for its ties
to the Mafia which allegedly used VEFA to launder large amounts of dirty
money.27
According to one press report (based on intelligence sources), senior members
of the Albanian government during the Presidency of Sali Berisha including
cabinet members and members of the secret police SHIK were alleged to be
involved in drugs trafficking and illegal arms trading into Kosovo:
(...) The allegations are very serious. Drugs, arms, contraband
cigarettes all are believed to have been handled by a company run
openly by
Albania's ruling Democratic Party, Shqiponja (...). In the course of 1996
Defence Minister, Safet Zhulali [was alleged] to had used his office to
facilitate the transport of arms, oil and contraband cigarettes. (...)
Drugs barons from Kosovo (...) operate in Albania with impunity, and much of
the transportation of heroin and other drugs across Albania, from
Macedonia
and Greece en route to Italy, is believed to be organised by Shik, the state
security police (...). Intelligence agents are convinced the chain of command
in the rackets goes all the way to the top and have had no hesitation in
naming
ministers in their reports.28
The trade in narcotics and weapons was allowed to prosper despite the presence
since 1993 of a large contingent of American troops at the Albanian-Macedonian
border with a mandate to enforce the embargo. The West had turned a blind eye.
The revenues from oil and narcotics were used to finance the purchase of arms
(often in terms of direct barter): "Deliveries of oil to Macedonia (skirting
the Greek embargo [in 1993-4] can be used to cover heroin, as do deliveries of
kalachnikov rifles to Albanian `brothers' in Kosovo".29
The Northern tribal clans or "fares" had also developed links with Italy's
crime syndicates.30 In turn, the latter played a key role in smuggling arms
across the Adriatic into the Albanian ports of Dures and Valona. At the outset
in 1992, the weapons channelled into Kosovo were largely small arms including
Kalashnikov AK-47 rifles, RPK and PPK machine-guns, 12.7 calibre heavy
machine-guns, etc.
The proceeds of the narcotics trade has enabled the KLA to rapidly develop a
force of some 30,000 men. More recently, the KLA has acquired more
sophisticated weaponry including anti-aircraft and antiarmor rockets. According
to Belgrade, some of the funds have come directly from the CIA "funnelled
through a so-called "Government of Kosovo" based in Geneva, Switzerland. Its
Washington office employs the public-relations firm of Ruder Finn--notorious
for its slanders of the Belgrade government".31
The KLA has also acquired electronic surveillance equipment which enables it to
receive NATO satellite information concerning the movement of the Yugoslav
Army. The KLA training camp in Albania is said to "concentrate on heavy weapons
training - rocket propelled grenades, medium caliber cannons, tanks and
transporter use, as well as on communications, and command and control".
(According to Yugoslav government sources.32
These extensive deliveries of weapons to the Kosovo rebel army were consistent
with Western geopolitical objectives. Not surprisingly, there has been a
"deafening silence" of the international media regarding the Kosovo arms-drugs
trade. In the words of a 1994 Report of the Geopolitical Drug Watch: "the
trafficking [of drugs and arms] is basically being judged on its geostrategic
implications (...) In Kosovo, drugs and weapons trafficking is fuelling
geopolitical hopes and fears"...33
The fate of Kosovo had already been carefully laid out prior to the signing of
the 1995 Dayton agreement. NATO had entered an unwholesome "marriage of
convenience" with the mafia. "Freedom fighters" were put in place, the
narcotics trade enabled Washington and Bonn to "finance the Kosovo conflict"
with the ultimate objective of destabilising the Belgrade government and fully
recolonising the Balkans. The destruction of an entire country is the outcome.
Western governments which participated in the NATO operation bear a heavy
burden of responsibility in the deaths of civilians, the impoverishment of both
the ethnic Albanian and Serbian populations and the plight of those who were
brutally uprooted from towns and villages in Kosovo as a result of the
bombings.
NOTES
1. Roger Boyes and Eske Wright, Drugs Money Linked to the Kosovo Rebels The
Times, London, Monday, March 24, 1999.
2. Ibid.
3. Philip Smucker and Tim Butcher, "Shifting stance over KLA has betrayed'
Albanians", Daily Telegraph, London, 6 April 1999
4. KDOM Daily Report, released by the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs,
Office of South Central European Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington,
DC, December 21, 1998; Compiled by EUR/SCE (202-647-4850) from daily reports of
the U.S. element of the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission, December 21, 1998.
5. "Rugova, sous protection serbe appelle a l'arret des raides", Le Devoir,
Montreal, 1 April 1999.
6. See Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia Harper and
Row, New York, 1972.
7. See John Dinges, Our Man in Panama, The Shrewd Rise and Brutal Fall of
Manuel Noriega, Times Books, New York, 1991.
8. "The Dirtiest Bank of All," Time, July 29, 1991, p. 22.
9. Truth in Media, Phoenix, 2 April, 1999; see also Michel Collon, Poker
Menteur, editions EPO, Brussels, 1997.
10. Quoted in Truth in Media, Phoenix, 2 April, 1999).
11. Ibid.
12. Geopolitical Drug Watch, No 32, June 1994, p. 4
13. Sean Gervasi, "Germany, US and the Yugoslav Crisis", Covert Action
Quarterly, No. 43, Winter 1992-93).
14. See Daily Telegraph, 29 December 1993.
15. For further details see Michel Collon, Poker Menteur, editions EPO,
Brussels, 1997, p. 288.
16. Truth in Media, Kosovo in Crisis, Phoenix, 2 April 1999.
17. Deutsche Presse-Agentur, March 13, 1998.
18. Ibid.
19. Daily News, Ankara, 5 March 1997.
20. Quoted in Boyes and Wright, op cit.
21. ANA, Athens, 28 January 1997, see also Turkish Daily News, 29 January 1997.
22. Brian Murphy, KLA Volunteers Lack Experience, The Associated Press, 5 April
1999.
23. See Geopolitical Drug Watch, No. 35, 1994, p. 3, see also Barry James, In
Balkans, Arms for Drugs, The International Herald Tribune Paris, June 6, 1994.
24. The Guardian, 25 March 1997.
25. For further details see Michel Chossudovsky, La crisi albanese, Edizioni
Gruppo Abele, Torino, 1998.
26. Ibid.
27. Andrew Gumbel, The Gangster Regime We Fund, The Independent, February 14,
1997, p. 15.
28. Ibid.
29. Geopolitical Drug Watch, No. 35, 1994, p. 3.
30. Geopolitical Drug Watch, No 66, p. 4.
31. Quoted in Workers' World, May 7, 1998.
32. See Government of Yugoslavia at
http://www.gov.yu/terrorism/terroristcamps.html.
33. Geopolitical Drug Watch, No 32, June 1994, p. 4.
Michel Chossudovsky
Department of Economics,
University of Ottawa,
Ottawa, K1N6N5
Voice box: 1-613-562-5800, ext. 1415
Fax: 1-514-425-6224
E-Mail: chossudovsky@sprint.ca
Recent articles by Chossudovsky :
on Yugoslavia:
http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/62/022.html
on the Brazilian financial crisis:
http://wwwdb.ix.de/tp/english/special/eco/6373/1.html
on global poverty and the financial crisis:
http://www.transnational.org/features/chossu_worldbank.html
http://www.transnational.org/features/g7solution.html
http://www.twnside.org.sg/souths/twn/title/scam-cn.htm
http://www.interlog.com/~cjazz/chossd.htm
http://www.heise.de/tp/english/special/eco/
http://heise.xlink.de/tp/english/special/eco/6099/1.html#anchor1
============ end of forwarded article ================