Re: Americans e-mailing thru terrorist countries

[Charlie Comsec <comsec@redneck.efga.org>]

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Anonymous <nobody@replay.com> wrote:

> >That's one of the reasons why I suggested a DOMESTIC remailer for
> >the first hop in the chain (preferably a Mixmaster Type II chain).
> >Even if the Brits are doing the NSA's dirty work for them, there is
> >still value in taking some minimal advantage of the legal
> >protections of US law.  
> 
> If ANY link crosses the border, you are fair game, under US law.
> Does the value of legal protection from NSA outweigh enhanced
> subpoena-proofing, via multiple jurisdictions?

IMO, no, it doesn't.  If your mail begins and ends in the United
States, even if it's routed abroad in the interim, then it probably
doesn't contain anything that would interest the NSA, even if they
did manage to intercept and decode it somehow.

To my knowledge, nothing I have ever sent or posted anonymously is a
matter of national security.

> NSA CAN track you.  Alimony lawyers CAN'T track your Mixmaster
> messages through 4 remailers without logs.  So, who do you need legal
> protection against?

Yes, I suppose NSA could track you.  But the idea is to keep the
cost/benefit ratio in your favor.  IOW, always choose a means of
delivering a message where the cost to track you exceeds the benefit
to the attacker of doing so.

> We need more US remailers, with all functions.
> Drule dropped mixmaster.
> EFGA is a middleman, and will send your mail abroad, if at the end of
> a chain.

Agreed on that.  The problem is that domestic remailers are the most
vulnerable, both to the long arm of the law as well as to litigious
private organizations.  The more principled ones would shut down
rather than cave in to a demand to out one of its users.  (Jeff
Burchell of Mailmasher/Huge Cajones fame comes to mind.) But might
not at least one succumb to the following scenario?:  A remailer is
sued for millions of dollars over some supposed abuse, but a
proposed settlement is offered.  The lawsuit will be dropped if the
remailer will continue operating, but with logging clandestinely
turned on and the logs delivered to the lawsuit's plaintiff.  How
many remailer operators could afford to spend thousands in legal
fees to defend against a frivolous lawsuit?  How many might be
tempted to accept such a proposed settlement, even at the cost of
betraying a user, especially if it's made to look as if the user in
question deserves it?  IOW, if someone is trying to track down a
political dissident, why not make the remailer operator think it's a
terrorist or kiddie pornographer instead?

> >Of course, I didn't mean to suggest that ANYTHING is 100% foolproof.
> >But why not use as many potential safeguards as possible ... just in
> >case.
> >
> >BTW, just to clarify something, I wasn't suggesting that Sadaam
> >Hussein or another dictator would be particularly pro-remailer.  In
> >fact, I'd fully expect that any remailer allowed to operate in such
> >a "rogue" nation would probably be blocked from accepting mail from
> >within that country.  But it sure is a way an international paraiah
> >could thumb his nose at the US for a minimal investment.
> 
> Do you want to send your mail in a manner which will seem to the US
> that you are thumbing your nose at their intelligence community?

It would be a bad idea if you were the only one doing it.  But if
doing so became standard practice...  Perhaps I should add an
additional condition and say that your first hop should be a HIGH
VOLUME Mixmaster domestic remailer to further thwart traffic
analysis.

Besides, the "Baghdad Remailer" doesn't have to be the FIRST foreign
hop.  Route it to a US remailer, then a German, Dutch, or Swiss
remailer next, before routing through a rogue nation's remailer.

- --
Charlie Comsec <comsec@redneck.efga.org>
Finger for PGP key


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